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Abstract
The ever-increasing availability of large data sets that store users’ judgments (such
as forecasts and preferences) and choices (such as acquisitions of goods and services)
provides a fertile ground for Behavioural Operational Research (BOR). In this paper
we review the streams of Behavioural Decision Research that might be useful for BOR
researchers and practitioners to analyse such behavioural data sets. We then suggest
ways that concepts from these streams can be employed in exploring behavioural data
sets for (i) detecting behavioural patterns, (ii) exploiting behavioural findings and
(iii) improving judgments and decisions of consumers and citizens. We also illustrate
how this taxonomy might be utilised in practice, in three real-world studies with
behavioural datasets generated by websites and on-line user activity.
Keywords: behavioural operational research, behavioural data mining, behavioural ana-
lytics.
1 Introduction
The explosive growth of sophisticated websites and online services that store users’ in-
formation and preferences has generated an increasing availability of large datasets to
Operational Research (OR) practitioners and researchers (Mortenson et al., 2014). One
important subset of such databases is what we term behavioural databases. A behavioural
database records judgments of users (for example estimates about a given variable, such
as predictions of results in sport analytics (Wright, 2013) or behaviour of bank users with
their bank accounts (Adams et al., 2001)) as well as their choices (for instance the services
that citizens utilize in a public service program (De Cnudde and Martens, 2015)).
Behavioural databases have been explored for both behavioural research (e.g. Gilovich
et al., 1985; Jullien and Salanie´, 2000; Ateca-Amestoy and Prieto-Rodriguez, 2013) and
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Information Systems research (e.g. Burtch et al., 2013; Goh et al., 2013; Provost et al.,
2015), as well as for commercial purposes (e.g. Davenport and Harris, 2007; Davenport
et al., 2010). However, guidelines for mining these datasets from an OR perspective, i.e.,
with a focus on improving decision making, are lacking.
On the other hand, the emergence of Behavioural Operational Research (BOR) (Hamalainen
et al., 2013; Franco and Hamalainen, 2016; Kunc et al., 2016) has emphasised the relevance
of behavioural issues for OR models and modellers. Some of these issues might require
the exploration of large behavioural data sets. For instance, understanding the behaviour
of bank customers with their money may help an OR analyst to optimise a bank’s bal-
ance sheet. The efficiency of delivering a public service might be maximised if a better
understanding of users’ choice patterns, recorded in a behavioural data base, enables the
operational researcher to fine tune the estimates of future demands.
The extensive developments of Behavioural Decision Research (BDR), since the break-
through paper by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), provide a rich source of models to an-
alyze behavioural data sets. BDR encompasses the well-known literature on behavioural
biases (Kahneman et al., 1982; Gilovich et al., 2002), but also the growing interest on
intertemporal choices (Read, 2007; Scholten and Read, 2010), on heuristics (Gigerenzer
and Gaissmaier, 2011), on the aggregation of individual judgments (Kerr and Tindale,
2011), and on debiasing (Fischhoff, 1982; Larrick, 2007; Montibeller and von Winterfeldt,
2015). However, the field is somehow fragmented, making it difficult for BOR researchers
and practitioners to fully deploy its insights and findings.
The aim of this paper is thus to conceptualize different modes for mining behavioural
datasets from a BOR perspective, rooted in well-established developments in BDR. We
review the streams of Behavioural Decision Research that might be useful in this context,
and suggest ways that such behavioural streams might be valuable for BOR researchers
and practitioners as a means of detecting behavioural patterns, exploiting behavioural
findings, and improving judgments and decisions. We illustrate how the taxonomy may
be employed in practice, presenting three real-world studies with behavioural datasets
generated by websites and on-line user activity.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section reviews
the different streams of BDR. The subsequent section conceptualizes the taxonomy for
exploring behavioural datasets that we propose. This is followed by an illustration of its
use in conceptualising three real-world cases employing behavioural datasets generated by
websites and on-line user activity. The paper concludes with some final remarks, discussion
of limitations and suggestions for further developments on this front.
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2 Streams in Behavioural Decision Research
The study of how unaided subjects make their judgments and choices, and how such
decisions can be improved, is the realm of Behavioural Decision Research (BDR). In this
section we identify six streams of research within BDR for BOR research to explore:
individual cognitive biases, prospect theory, intertemporal choice, debiasing, heuristics, and
collective judgments. Each of these streams is a vast sub-field; here we just describe them
briefly and provide pointers to further literature.
2.1 The Cognitive Biases Stream
After the inception of Behavioural Decision Theory in the early 1960’s (Edwards, 1961),
two major approaches have emerged: one based on the cognitive illusions paradigm and
another based on the engineering psychology paradigm (von Winterfeldt, 1999).
Researchers adopting the cognitive illusions paradigm compare a normative decision
principle (such as Bayes’ rule) with actual behaviour in judgment and choice (such as
the actual updating of prior probabilities). Discrepancies between the normative principle
and the observed behaviour characterize a cognitive bias (such as conservatism in Bayesian
updates, one of the first identified biases (Phillips and Edwards, 1966)). From the seminal
work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), a large body of knowledge has emerged (e.g.
Kahneman et al., 1982; Gilovich et al., 2002) that investigates the mental heuristics that
lead to systematic cognitive biases. We thus refer to this as the individual cognitive biases
stream.
A large number of these biases have been identified (see Bazerman and Moore (2008)
for an introductory overview). Some of the most well-known biases, which are not only ob-
servable in experimental settings but also in real-world decision making (von Winterfeldt,
1999; Montibeller and von Winterfeldt, 2015), are: anchoring (the a priori presentation of
an unrelated numerical value influences the estimate of a given parameter (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974)), framing (the way a prospect is presented, either as a loss or as a gain,
has an impact on the choice made (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)), and overconfidence
(estimates of ranges of a variable that are too narrow or of probabilities of future events
occurring that are not realistic (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977)).
2.2 The Prospect Theory Stream
Another major contribution of the cognitive illusions paradigm was the development of
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), which
suggests a descriptive model for decisions under uncertainty. The three main components
of such a model are: a reference point (zero utility) demarcating gains and losses; a two-
part S-shaped utility function that is concave for gains and convex for losses; and an an
3
inverse S-shape weighting function for probability estimates.
A prospect theory model thus allows one to represent different decision attitudes to
gains and losses, as well as over-weighting of low-probability events and under-weighting
of high-probability events. It also highlights the importance of framing effects (whether a
prospect is presented as a loss or gain) and of loss aversion (the asymmetry between losses
and gains, with the former looming larger than the latter). These aspects are frequently
observable in unsupported decision making (for a comprehensive coverage of this theory
see Wakker (2010) and Kahneman and Tversky (2000)). We term this the prospect theory
stream.
2.3 The Intertemporal Choice Stream
The third behavioural stream, intertemporal choice, which is also based on the cognitive
illusion paradigm, analyses the relative value that subjects attribute to benefits and costs
at different points in time. The normative model for intertemporal choice, proposed by
Fisher and by Samuelson in the 1930s (for a historical review see Loewenstein (1992))
uses exponential discounting with a constant discount rate, and is widely employed in net
present value economic analysis. It reflects both opportunity cost and time preferences,
where a payment of a given value is preferred earlier than later (Read, 2007).
In a similar way as with the previous two streams, empirical research into time pref-
erences has shown several deviations from this normative standard, such as: time incon-
sistencies (with the use of a hyperbolic discount functions instead of exponential ones),
sign effects (lower discounting for losses than for gains), magnitude effects (lower discount
rates for large amounts than for small amounts), and framing effects affecting such choices
(Read, 2007; Scholten and Read, 2010; Attema, 2012).
2.4 The Debiasing Stream
While the cognitive illusions paradigm has mainly been focused on developing descriptive
models of decision making, the main aim of those embracing the engineering psychology
paradigm in Behavioural Decision Theory is to improve decision makers’ judgments and
choices. Researchers in this paradigm identify problems decision makers might have in
implementing a normative rule and provide suitable tools to overcome such problems (von
Winterfeldt, 1999), debiasing judgments and value/probability elicitation (Montibeller
and von Winterfeldt, 2015; Morton and Fasolo, 2009). For instance, the elicitation of
estimates for a given variable, which could be too narrow due to the overconfidence bias,
might be stretched by using counterfactual questions as debiasing tools. The elicitation of
preferences over a set of alternatives might be debiased against the framing bias by using
adequate elicitation protocols that emphasise the equivalence of gains and loss prospects.
The debiasing literature has focused mostly on probability judgments, and although
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early efforts proved ineffective (Fischhoff, 1982) a rich theory and practice has since devel-
oped, most notably including the use of adequate incentives, suitable cognitive strategies,
and adjusted elicitation procedures, the latter both for probability (e.g. Spetzler and Stae¨l
Von Holstein, 1975; Johnson and Bruce, 2001; Garthwaite et al., 2005) and preference
elicitation (e.g. Wakker and Deneffe, 1996; Delquie, 1997; Carlson and Bond, 2006). In
more general terms, a better understanding of the mechanisms that generate biases can
in certain cases provide suggestions for debiasing (Arkes, 1991; Larrick, 2007; Montibeller
and von Winterfeldt, 2015). We call this field the debiasing stream.
2.5 The Heuristics Stream
In the cognitive illusions paradigm, the role of mental heuristics is seen as negative: they
constitute sub-optimal judgmental strategies in comparison to a normative rule. Further-
more, its focus is on externally observable cognitive biases generated by such sub-optimal
heuristics, instead of the heuristics themselves (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996).
An opposite view about the role of heuristics is the one Gigerenzer and his associates
have championed. In his perspective heuristics play the central role, being defined as
“strategies that ignore information to make decisions faster, more frugally, and/or more
accurately than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 453).
This field of research, which we refer to as the heuristics stream, places its main
emphasis on understanding in depth which heuristic is being used in a given judgment
(for an overview see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011)). Heuristics they identify include:
the recognition heuristic (if only one of two alternatives is recognized then it has higher
value), the fluency heuristic (if both alternatives are recognized, the one recognized faster
has higher value), the hiatus heuristic (the customer is classified as inactive after not
purchasing for a given number of months), simple non-compensatory decision rules (such as
the lexicographic rule, in which alternatives are evaluated on the most important attribute,
in case some of them have the same performance on this attribute, the performance of
these remaining alternatives on the second most important attribute is considered and so
on until a choice is made), and simple compensatory decision rules (such as counting the
number of cues favoring an alternative). Sharing a positive agenda about decision making
capabilities with the engineering psychology paradigm, it sees many of these heuristics as
efficient ways of reaching accurate judgments.
2.6 The Collective Judgments Stream
The sixth stream in BDR is the collective judgments steam. This has a much longer history
of formal research than the previous five, dating back to Galton (1907) demonstrating that
the median of estimates produces a highly accurate estimate itself (for a discussion see
Levy and Peart (2002); for a recent review on collective judgments see Kerr and Tindale
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(2011))
On the aggregation of individual preferences, early scientific works started with de
Borda and Condorcet in the 18th century, followed by Arrow’s impossibility theorem and
the field of social choice theory (see Gaertner (2009)). More recent developments have
suggested the aggregation of individual cardinal utility rather than ordinal preferences (e.g.
Keeney and Nau, 2011). The main aims of the collective judgment stream are therefore to:
i) understand how individual estimates or preferences from a group should be aggregated;
ii) assess how precise the aggregate estimates are, or in case of preferences how fair the
aggregation rule is; iii) identify what cognitive biases may impact on such judgments.
Behavioural OR practitioners and researchers usually have a clearly prescriptive per-
spective for their analysis (for a distinction between prescriptive, normative and descriptive
approaches see Bell et al. (1988)). This is in contrast to BDR findings and frameworks in
the cognitive biases, intertemporal choice, and prospect theory streams (as well as most of
the heuristics stream) which follow a descriptive approach. Most of the work on the collec-
tive judgment stream is either normative or descriptive, again fitting with BDR research
interests. Only the debiasing stream has a clear prescriptive emphasis. Furthermore, with
the exception of the collective judgment stream, the others rely heavily on evidence from
relatively small-scale laboratory experiments (Bardsley, 2005; Robinson et al., 2017).
The question thus is how this vast body of knowledge in BDR could be employed
by BOR researchers and practitioners who want to explore behavioural datasets. We
suggest ways of exploring them in the next section, and review studies where analyses of
behavioural issues have been conducted using real-world behavioural data sets, although
not necessarily with a prescriptive approach.
3 Exploring Behavioural Datasets
We suggest here that the process of analyzing behavioural data sets can be conceptualized
as having three main purposes for the analysis: (i) detecting users’ behavioural trends and
patterns, (ii) exploiting behavioural findings, and (iii) improving users’ judgments and
choices. Such a process must lead to behavioural insights which help BOR researchers
and practitioners to improve systematic behavioural data collection, increase its learning
about users’ judgments and behavioural patterns, and support evidence-based decision
making.
This definition highlights three main modes for exploring behavioural datasets: detect-
ing behavioural patterns, exploiting behavioural findings, and improving users’ judgments.
We now suggest how each one of these modes can be employed within the BDR stream
identified in the previous section and describe examples where such analyses have been
employed using behavioural databases.
The detection of behavioural trends and patterns in users’ judgments and choices is
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by some way the most developed of the three modes in BDR research. The cognitive bias
stream provides a plethora of biases that can be investigated in behavioural databases.
Several applications to sports data sets have been reported (e.g. Kocher et al., 2012),
most notably the search of evidence for or against the “hot hand” hypothesis in basketball
and other sports (Gilovich et al., 1985; Bar-Eli et al., 2006). Prospect theory provides a
useful framework for identifying risk attitudes and reference points of users, for instance
Jullien and Salanie´ (2000) provide an application using British racetrack patrons. In
a similar way, descriptive frameworks for intertemporal choices can be used to identify
what kind of discounting function users are employing, as well as biases in comparison
with the normative model, for example the effect of framing in borrowing and lending
decisions of private households conducted by Breuer and Soypak (2012). The detection
of heuristics in behavioural data sets is to date rather more limited, but an interesting
example is the comparison of the hiatus heuristic against normative decision rules for
three industries, conducted by Wu¨bben and Wangenheim (2008). Following the collective
judgment stream, behavioural analysis can help in describing which social decision scheme
a group is using (Kerr and Tindale, 2011), or how accurate a forecast is (Clemen and
Winkler, 2007), as exemplified by the extensive analysis of accuracy of weather forecasts
conducted by Clemen and Winkler (1990). As these examples illustrate, despite a relatively
large number of analysis of behavioural issues already available in the literature, they are
typically descriptive.
The second mode we suggest for analysing behavioural datasets is to exploit be-
havioural findings. This of course has already been done in marketing and sales in practice
(Bazerman, 2001), but again we believe that behavioural data sets are rich sources for BOR
studies and applications. There are several ways of exploiting cognitive biases: for exam-
ple, after detecting inadequate time discounting for debt repayment Capital One targeted
customers that borrowed large amounts on credit cards and repaid them slowly (Daven-
port and Harris, 2007). Prospect theory can help in framing products in a positive way by
changing the reference point, such as in the marketing of financial products (Shefrin and
Statman, 1993). The UK Government Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team have
used large experimental trials to show how framing effects can be successfully exploited to
increase the prevalence of salary-based charitable donations (Behavioural Insights Team,
2013a) and registration for organ donation from members of the public (Behavioural In-
sights Team, 2013b). The heuristics stream may be employed to identify the heuristic
guiding choices of users and then exploit this finding, such as the use of recognition
heuristic for assembling investment portfolios (Ortmann et al., 2008). The intertempo-
ral choice stream can support the understanding of time preferences of customers, such as
their trade-off between delivery time versus delivery cost in online shopping (Zauberman
et al., 2009). Analysis about collective judgments can be used to increase the appeal of
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products and services offered to a group of users. Of course, ethical issues arise when
BOR practitioners are exploiting such behavioural trends, and those must be carefully
considered in every application.
The third mode for exploring behavioural datasets is to improve the judgments and
choices of users involved in transactions stored by these data bases. This can be an aim
for customers of private organizations, as advocated by Bazerman (2001), as well as for
citizens in public contexts (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Keeney, 2008). Patterns identified
by the cognitive biases and prospect theory streams can often be reduced or eliminated
by the use of adequate tools, such as proper incentives and engineered elicitation tools
(Fischhoff, 1982; Arkes, 1991; von Winterfeldt, 1999; Larrick, 2007; Montibeller and von
Winterfeldt, 2015). In a similar way, the understanding of intertemporal choices and
preferences can help either to guide individual decisions or to design better public policies,
such as changing health-related behaviours or long-term health planning, respectively
(Attema, 2012). An understanding of efficient heuristics can help to improve the speed
and accuracy of judgments (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). Collective judgments can
be improved by using adequate aggregation rules of individual estimates (Clemen and
Winkler, 2007; Kerr and Tindale, 2011) and debiasing individual estimates. With the
exception of “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Johnson et al., 2012), for instance
making opting-in the default for pension planning, we are not aware of such debiasing
efforts in behavioural databases. There are thus opportunities for BOR practitioners on
this front.
Table 1 summarizes the BDR streams and the possible modes that they can be used for
exploring behavioural datasets. We see two ways of employing this taxonomy in practice.
The first one is descriptively, to conceptualise studies in which behavioural data sets were
explored and root it within BDR stream(s) with a clear mode of practice. The second one
is prescriptively: the BOR analyst might use it to help identifying which issues she may
want to explore and locate them within BDR stream(s), then decide what is her purpose
in the data exploration. Next we show how the taxonomy might be employed in practice.
4 Exploring Behavioural Datasets in Action
In this section we present three illustrative examples, using real-world behavioural datasets,
which showcase the three modes of exploration we suggested (detecting in Study 1, ex-
ploiting in Study 2, improving in Study 3). We have attempted to give broad coverage
in terms of BDR streams (collective judgments in Study 1, prospect theory and heuristics
in Study 2, and cognitive biases and debiasing in Study 3). The cases are essentially a
convenience sample based upon which datasets and findings were available to us and not
limited by confidentiality agreements. Our aim in these three examples is to show the
potential that behavioural data mining can provide, and to give a sense of the kinds of
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BDR Streams Key Sources Key Concepts Modes
Cognitive
Biases
Tversky and Kah-
neman
Systematic individual cognitive bi-
ases causing judgments to deviate
from normative standards.
Detect
Exploit
Prospect The-
ory
Tversky and Kah-
neman
Descriptively valid decision mod-
els (reference points, S-shape utility
functions, weighted probability func-
tions).
Detect
Exploit
Intertemporal
Choices
Loewenstein,
Read
Preferences for delayed benefits and
costs deviate from normative stan-
dards.
Detect
Exploit
Debiasing Fischhoff, Larrick Use of adequate tools (proper incen-
tives, suitable elicitation protocols,
and improved cognitive strategies) to
reduce or remove cognitive biases.
Improve
Heuristics Gigerenzer Simplified cognitive strategies which
allow faster and/or more accurate
decisions.
Detect
Exploit
Improve
Collective
Judgments
Galton (esti-
mates), Arrow
(preferences)
Aggregation of individual judgments
(estimates or preferences).
Detect
Exploit
Improve
Table 1: Exploring Behavioural Datasets.
questions that might be tackled in the various modes of behavioural analysis, rather than
a comprehensive analysis of a particular decision problem or an attempt of trying every
possible combination in our taxonomy.
4.1 Case I: Assessing the “wisdom of the crowd” for non-convex loss
functions (Detect mode)
Our first case is drawn from the collective judgments stream, and adopts a detect mode
to evaluate the quality of collective judgments in a sports prediction game.
4.1.1 Overview
The “wisdom of the crowd” is a popular aphorism used when a collective judgment per-
forms well relative to the individual judgments that comprise it (Surowiecki, 2005; Vul
and Pashler, 2008; O¨nkal et al., 2012). Studies have shown that when averaging is used
both to aggregate individual judgments and errors, collective judgments are more accurate
for any convex loss function (Larrick and Soll, 2006), typically by between 3% and 24%
(Armstrong, 2001).
Our study is motivated by an application where collective judgments were often found
to perform relatively poorly in a sports prediction game. Unusually, in this application
poor collective judgments are not necessarily viewed negatively. Users are given post-game
feedback about how their predictions compared to the collective prediction. Poor collec-
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tive predictions thus potentially paint individual players in a favourable light, giving them
the impression that their own predictions were relatively good, and thus that they possess
above-average forecasting ‘skill’. Our clients wanted to explore this lack of “crowd wis-
dom” and better understand how it was affected by their choice of function for rewarding
predictions.
Our analysis shows that the apparent poor performance is due to the non-convexity of
a loss function that is routinely used to evaluate sports predictions, and that the collective
judgment in fact performs well under more conventional loss functions like absolute error
(AE).
4.1.2 The Context: Sports Prediction Games
The case is based on research conducted for Superbru, an online sports prediction game
in which players arrange themselves into groups for the duration of a sports tournament
(http://www.superbru.com). Players are awarded points for close predictions and com-
pete within their groups to maximize the number of points earned. Players may belong to
multiple groups, typically one or two small groups of friends or work colleagues, and two
large groups consisting of supporters of the same team and the entire user-base. Playing
the game is not incentivised by the company with financial rewards (except for the most
accurate player in a tournament wins a prize with a cash value between $500 and $2,000,
with over 80,000 users this is not considered to be a significant cash incentive), limiting
the degree to which findings can be extended to more common sports betting contexts.
For the tournament we analyzed, predictions consist of two components: a winning
team and a margin of victory. Users earn one point for correctly predicting the winning
team, and half a point if their margin prediction is within five points of the actual score
margin.
4.1.3 Data and Methodology
Our data consists of 8.7 million predictions made by 87,899 users over the course of the
Super Rugby tournament held in 2011, as well as the country of origin and team supported
by each user. The Super Rugby tournament is the largest rugby union tournament in
the Southern Hemisphere; in 2011 it consisted of 15 regional teams from New Zealand,
Australia and South Africa. The league phase of the tournament consisted of 119 games,
followed by 5 knock-out games.
Individual judgments constitute our basic data, while collective judgments (the ”crowd
prediction”) is given by the mean of the predictions made for each game. For each game
then, we can assess the accuracy of both individual and collective judgments using the
following three loss functions:
1. Superbru error (SBE). From a baseline of zero, a prediction incurs penalties (i.e.
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errors) of p points if the winning team is incorrectly predicted and 0.5p points if
the predicted points margin differs from the actual points margin by more than five
points. These errors are added together to form the SBE. The choice of p is arbitrary
and does not affect results when examining the metric in isolation (i.e. the extreme
left boxplots in Figure 2), but because we later form weighted combinations of the
SBE and AE we select p so that the mean SBE over games is equal to the mean AE.
This is a heuristic means of providing rough comparability between the scales of the
error metrics. The mean SBE is 0.74p and the mean AE is 12.55, so p is set to 17.
2. Absolute error (AE).
3. Bounded absolute error (BAE). This loss function returns the AE within the error
margin [-5; +5] and a constant error of 5 outside of these bounds. As for the
SBE, this function can also be scaled arbitrarily by a factor r that has no effect
on the performance of the BAE metric but ensure comparability (on average) when
forming convex combinations with the SBE. The mean BAE is 4.35 and we therefore
set r = 2.9.
Figure 1 shows the loss functions with p = 17 and r = 2.9.
−5 0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
25
Predicted margin
E
rr
or
AE
BAE
SBE
Figure 1: Loss functions used to evaluate collective judgments, assuming an actual points
margin of +9. SBE = error used by the Superbru game; AE and BAE = unbounded and
bounded absolute error respectively.
4.1.4 Results
The top set of boxplots in Figure 2 shows distributions of the relative improvement re-
turned by collective judgments for convex combinations of the SBE (left-most boxplot)
and AE (right-most boxplot). The distributions show that, under the kind of non-convex
loss functions often used in sports prediction games, collective judgments (a) return on
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average smaller errors than the average errors made with individual judgments, but (b)
return substantially worse forecast errors relatively often – note that the lower quartile
for a SBE-only loss function shows that in one quarter of games the error from the crowd
prediction is at least 8% larger than the average user error.
If all weight is placed on the AE, collective judgments improve forecast errors by on
average 25%. Although there is substantial between-game variability (improvements vary
from less than 0.01% to 96%) and strong positive skewness (the median improvement is
11%), the results return the expected “crowd wisdom” effect and agree in broad terms
with the effect sizes reported in Armstrong (2001). Under the non-convex loss function
currently used by the game (i.e. with zero weight placed on the AE), the mean and median
improvement are actually larger than under AE loss (29% and 16% respectively), but more
notably in 51 of the 125 games played the collective judgment is shown as inferior, at times
substantially so.
Figure 2: Boxplots showing distributions of reductions in errors obtained using collective
judgments (relative to the average errors of individual judgments) for convex combinations
of the SBE and AE (top panel) and SBE and BAE (bottom panel). Boxes show medians
and quartiles; whiskers show non-outlying minima and maxima; and means are indicated
with crosses.
The bottom set of boxplots in Figure 2 shows that the “wisdom of the crowd” is substan-
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tially reduced as the BAE (right-most boxplot) is incorporated into the SBE (left-most
boxplot), both in mean and median terms. In small amounts, the BAE decreases the
variability of the crowd effect by drawing in the right-tail (good crowd performance) far
more than the left-tail (poor crowd performance). The net effect is that although mean
and median crowd wisdom decline substantially as the weight placed on AE decreases, the
frequency of inferior collective judgments remains relatively constant until a substantial
weight is placed on the BAE (in our example, exceeding 30%). As more weight is placed
on the BAE the median and mean crowd wisdom eventually become negative. While
basing the game purely on BAE is not considered to be a desirable option because of the
enjoyment derived from predicting winning teams, a reward function that includes a small
BAE component is practically feasible. One such function (effectively placing a one-third
weight on BAE) would simply augment the current margin system by offering between 0.5
and 1 points for a predicted-actual margin difference of between five and no points.
4.1.5 Behavioural Insights
Here the analysis of the behavioural dataset showed that “the wisdom of crowds” is heavily
dependent on how judgmental estimates are evaluated, and hence something that is at
least partly under the control of the Superbru’s developers. The frequent lack of “crowd
wisdom” observed in the game was shown to be a desirable but unintended side effect of
the choice of loss function, and something that could even be reduced further by small
modifications to the currently-used loss function. A related concern was that some users
might be cheating by creating multiple profiles and using these to gather information on
collective judgments (shown to users once they have submitted their own predictions).
Our behavioural analysis suggested that there is relatively little to be gained from such a
strategy, particularly under the proposed loss function, and that the issue of if and when
to show information about collective judgments is predominantly one of user experience
(including perceived fairness) rather than actual fairness.
4.2 Case II: Determinants of charitable giving between users of an online
slot machine game (Exploiting mode)
Our second case is drawn from the heuristics stream, but employing also concepts from the
prospect theory stream. It illustrates how the exploiting mode can be used to determine a
strategy for increasing the likelihood of charitable giving between users of an online slot
machine game.
4.2.1 Overview
Previous research suggests that people’s propensity for giving can be influenced by, among
other things, asset class, how the assets have been acquired, recipients and the potential
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for reciprocity, and past behaviour (e.g. Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Hoffman et al., 1994,
1996; Soyer and Hogarth, 2011). Fairness and reciprocity have been studied by opera-
tions researchers working in supply chain management, where it has been shown to play
an important part in empirical contracting mechanisms (Loch and Wu, 2008; Katok and
Wu, 2009). Several researchers have viewed fairness and reciprocity from a “heuristic”
perspective (Axelrod, 1984; Todd et al., 2008), demonstrating how simple heuristic strate-
gies (“tit-for-tat”, for example) can perform well in interactive, iterative decision contexts
(Kraines and Kraines, 1993; Messick and Liebrand, 1995). Furthermore, several of the
empirical findings around charitable giving can be explained as reference-point effects i.e.
they influence what are viewed as gains and losses, with subsequent impacts on decision
making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Arkes, 1991). While these effects are essentially
heuristic in nature, they are also one important element of prospect theory. Hence, there
are some insights from that stream in this case.
Our client wanted to encourage the “gifting” (giving without incurring personal loss) of
tokens by its users. From the perspective of the online casino, gifting is desirable because
it targets potential new users and introduces a social aspect into the game. We find that,
despite the fact that users are giving away the casino’s tokens (rather than their own),
users are more likely to gift if they have themselves been the object of gifting, either from
other users or by redeeming daily offers made by the casino.
4.2.2 The Context: Social Slot Machines
The case is based on research conducted for Online Skill Ltd.’s Clickfun Casino appli-
cation, a suite of online slot machine games that are hosted on the web and Facebook
(http://www.clickfun.com and http://apps.facebook.com/clickfuncasino). The
games are not played for any monetary reward. Users receive a certain base quantity
of free tokens each day when they log onto the game, and in addition have the option to
claim further “bonus” tokens (a small quantity for each hour that they are logged on for,
and a larger quantity by following an email link sent out once per day). Further tokens
may be purchased for cash. Tokens can only be used to play the games i.e. cannot be
redeemed or used in any other way.
Users can also “gift” parcels of tokens to any contact in their social network. The
“gifted” tokens do not reduce the user’s balance, but each user is limited to giving one
parcel of 50 tokens (or 10 “spins”, worth approximately 150 tokens) per contact per day.
4.2.3 Data and Hypotheses
Data is continuously collected in the form of time-stamped game events (spins, wins,
coupon activity, sending and receiving tokens, etc.) for each user. Our current analysis
is based on event data obtained for some 6.3 million events obtained for a subsample of
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12,000 users over a five-day period. From this data, we extract information on the number
of token and spin parcels gifted by each user. We wish to relate these outcomes to the
following inputs:
• x1: an indicator of whether spin gifts were received from other users;
• x2: an indicator of whether token gifts were received from other users;
• x3: the number of bonus tokens claimed (centered and scaled to unit variance to
facilitate interpretation);
• x4: an indicator of whether bonus tokens were actually played;
• x5: the “win percentage” (total number of tokens won divided by total number of
tokens played);
• x6: the total number of spins made (log-transformed).
On the basis of previous research, we expect that being the recipient of charitable gifts
will exert a stronger positive influence on the propensity to gift than personally “earnings”,
whether measured by success or time expended (Hoffman et al., 1994; Rutstro¨m and
Williams, 2000). Because exchanges are between social network contacts and parties are
personally identified, we expect user-to-user giving to exert a stronger influence than
relatively anonymous company-to-user giving (Majolo et al., 2006). We do, however, still
expect a significant company-to-user effect (Khouja et al., 2013, e.g.).
4.2.4 Results
Table 2 shows odds ratios (OR) and related significance results for logistic regression
models fitted to our data. All fit indices indicated that our models fit reasonably though
not exceptionally well. Likelihood-ratio tests against null models are highly significant
(spins: χ26 = 3351.61, p < 0.001; tokens: χ
2
6 = 1581.92, p < 0.001), and pseudo-R
2’s
are fairly high (spins: 32.3%; tokens: 24.3%). Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests
returned non-significant i.e. favorable, results (spins: χ28 = 12.26, p = 0.14; tokens:
χ28 = 9.95, p = 0.27). At optimal cut-off values model sensitivity and specificity are 76%
(spins, cut-off = 0.16) and 75% (tokens, cut-off = 0.07). Areas under the ROC curves are
0.85 (spins) and 0.83 (tokens) models respectively.
Both spin and token models show substantial agreement. Receiving and redeeming gifts
from other users shows the largest positive association with gifting propensity. Relation-
ships are strongest where the received and sent gifts take the same form. Receiving spins
increases the likelihood of sending spins more than receiving coins does, and vice versa.
A weaker but still strongly significant positive association exists between gifting propen-
sity and receiving and redeeming gifts from the company itself. Here, where we can discern
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Spin parcels gifted Token parcels gifted
OR s.e. z OR s.e. z
x1 Received spin gift 12.54 0.91 34.73 5.75 0.48 20.86
x2 Received token gift 4.98 0.78 10.21 13.11 1.86 18.09
x3 Bonuses claimed 1.24 0.04 6.20 1.29 0.04 7.39
x4 Bonuses used 4.18 0.45 13.27 2.14 0.28 5.73
x5 Win % 0.91 0.11 -0.75 0.99 0.13 -0.08
x6 ln(N.spins) 1.15 0.03 5.16 1.14 0.04 4.04
Table 2: Odds ratios and related significance results for logistic regression
the effect of receiving and actually using the gifts, it appears that the act of using a gift has
a stronger influence on gifting than merely claiming and storing it. The two measures of
“earned” winnings (effort and success) play the smallest (in the case of winnings, insignif-
icant) role. The non-significance of winnings may be due to these being non-monetary
and related to chance in a transparent way, although in mitigation of this a number of
studies have found that winnings from gambling are usually interpreted as “earned” (see
Delfabbro (2004), or Biner et al. (1998) for a non-monetary example).
4.2.5 Behavioural Insights
Online Skill’s case involves a number of peculiarities. Users are encouraged to donate gifts
that do not belong to them, have no monetary value, and do not form part of a zero-sum
transaction (in the sense that nobody is disadvantaged by the transaction). Nevertheless,
some familiar behavioural patterns emerge. Users are more likely to initiate the gifting
transaction if they have been recipient of a gift than if they have been successful through
their own doing. Gifts received from a (usually known) individual exercise a larger effect
than gifts received from the company itself, but the latter still elicits a positive response.
Spending time playing also positively influences gifting, although less strongly; winning,
apparently, plays no significant role. This suggests that gifting arises predominantly out
of a sense of fairness and obligation, and that this sense is unaffected by success.
From Online Skill’s perspective a positive feature of the gifting process is that is appears
to be self-reinforcing, so that the company’s primary aim should be on initializing rather
than maintaining gifting. The two basic options available for this are to increase the win
percentage (since no money is at stake) or to offer more (or more attractive) bonuses. Our
analysis suggests that the latter would be far more productive. As the number of bonuses
on offer in the game is already large, users should ideally simply be encouraged to take
up and use the existing offers. This applies particularly to users who are not currently
gifting. Although these results do not directly suggest how this goal could best be achieved,
Behavioural analysis clearly provides a means for customizing and continuously assessing
the effect of any potential strategies.
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4.3 Case III: Debiasing insufficient adjustment in online sports predic-
tions (Improving mode)
Our third case is a hypothetical application of the improving mode and uses concepts from
the cognitive biases and debiasing streams of BDR. Although we have not implemented
any debiasing procedures in reality, this final case hopefully provides some illustration how
BOR practitioners might use this mode, in this case to improve the predictions made in
the context of an online sports prediction game.
4.3.1 Overview
Forecasts, like many kinds of judgments, are prone to biases arising from use of heuristics.
A number of previous studies (Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992; O’Connor et al., 1993;
Lawrence and O’Connor, 1995) have shown that people over-react to the feedback provided
by the last actual value when setting their new forecasts. Other studies have shown that
affective or emotional responses can also play a significant role in the setting of forecasts
(e.g. Wilson and Gilbert, 2003).
The particular type of forecast we consider here is a prediction of the outcome of a
competitive match between two teams in a league setting. That is, each contest involves
two teams, teams compete regularly over the course of a relative short season (once per
week for 14 weeks in our setting), and each team plays each other team only once (or a
small number of times) over the course of a season, so that “learning opportunities” are
limited.
The aim of the current case is to demonstrate the existence of a systematic tendency to
under-react to historical information for teams of which one is a supporter, using the same
Superbru predictions examined in Case 1, and to suggest ways in which these forecasts
may be debiased, in the sense of reducing the magnitude of the observed biases.
4.3.2 Data and Hypotheses
Our data consists of 8.4 million predictions made by 87,603 users in 119 Super 15 rugby
matches over the course of a single season in 2011 – a more detailed description was
provided in Section 4.1.
One plausible mechanism for creating forecasts in the given context is to start with an
initial assessment of the general quality of the two teams, and then adjust this assessment
by taking into account recent information about the teams – most notably, how they per-
formed in the previous week’s matches. Standard heuristics-and-biases research suggests
that the strength of the anchor will be partly determined by affective or emotional re-
sponses to the teams involved (e.g. Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). This leads directly to the
hypothesis that the sensitivity of predicted outcomes to past performance will be lower
for fans of a team than for non-fans. We test this hypothesis by fitting a linear model to
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the predicted winning margin yi,t given by subject i in game t:
yi,t = β0 + β1ht−1 + β2at−1 + β3F
(h)
i + β4F
(a)
i + β5ht−1F
(h)
i + β6at−1F
(a)
i + i,t
where ht−1 and at−1 denote the actual margin of the home (away) team in its previous
game, F
(h)
i and F
(a)
i are binary variables indicating whether subject i is a self-reported
supporter of the current home (away) team, and i,t is a random error term.
Because two teams are involved in each game (one of which plays “at home” and the
other “away”) the sign of yi,t is arbitrary and we denote positive (negative) values to
mean a win for the home (away) team. Note though that positive value for ht−1 and at−1
indicates a win for that team i.e. ht−1 > 0 and at−1 > 0 mean wins for the current home
team and current away team in their previous matches (irrespective of whether these were
played home or away).
Our hypothesis about the role of affect implies that, in the above linear model:
• β1 > 0 (a positive association between past and forecasted performance of the home
team); β3 > 0 (a positive fan bias for the home team); and β5 < 0 (smaller adjust-
ment i.e. a weaker relationship between past and forecasted performance for fans of
the home team),
• β2 < 0 (a positive association between past and forecasted performance of the away
team, noting the sign change), β4 < 0 (a positive fan bias for the away team)
β6 > 0 (smaller adjustment i.e. a weaker relationship between past and forecasted
performance for fans of the away team).
In order to also make some assessment of the sensitivity of actual (rather than pre-
dicted) performance to past performance, we fit a second linear model to the actual winning
margin ht (again, orientated so that a positive value denotes a win for the home side).
The observed winning margin ht in game t is modelled by:
ht = β7 + β8ht−1 + β9at−1 + t
This model is fitted to data gathered on all observed game results from the inception of the
Super Rugby tournament in 2006 up to and including the 2011 season. This gives a total
of n = 575 games (note that in this case games are the unit of observation rather than
forecasts made by a user for a game – hence the much smaller sample size). The results
obtained from this second model provides the historical sensitivity of actual performance
to past performance in Super Rugby games and thus provides a basis for an approximate
comparison of whether forecasts are more or less sensitive to past performance than actual
results.
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4.3.3 Results
Table 3 shows coefficients (with associated standard errors in parentheses) for the two
linear models described above. All effects are highly significant at p < 0.001 although the
models explain only a moderate proportion of the variation in their respective outcomes:
R2 = 18% for forecasted margins and R2 = 10% for actual margins. We find that, on av-
erage, home ground advantage conveyed an actual benefit of 4.6 points, but that predicted
outcomes only favour the home side by 2.8 points – that is, the effect of playing at home
is systematically underestimated by Superbru users. In contrast to previous research (e.g.
Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992; O’Connor et al., 1993; Lawrence and O’Connor, 1995), we
find that forecasts i.e. predicted outcomes, show the same sensitivity to previous perfor-
mance as do actual outcomes – no significant differences are observed. Turning to our
hypothesised relationships, values for β1 through β6 are all in the hypothesised direction
and are highly significant, demonstrating that affective responses result in systematic bi-
ases in favour of the supported team, and a tendency to underweight empirical data in
the form of past performance (more so for the home team than the away team).
Forecasts Actual
Variable Description βj Coef. (SE) βj Coef. (SE)
Intercept Home advantage β0 2.779 (0.004) β7 4.604 (0.708)
ht−1 Last performance (home) β1 0.217 (0.001) β8 0.252 (0.044)
at−1 Last performance (away) β2 -0.187 (0.001) β9 -0.184 (0.041)
F (h) Fan (home) β3 5.228 (0.015) n/a
F (a) Fan (away) β4 -6.147 (0.015) n/a
ht−1F (h) Last perf. × Fan (home) β5 -0.068 (0.001) n/a
at−1F (a) Last perf. × Fan (home) β6 0.016 (0.001) n/a
Table 3: Results from two linear models show the sensitivity of forecasted and actual
performance to past performance and fan status, demonstrating the importance of affective
responses to forecast behaviuor.
4.3.4 Behavioural Insights
The analysis above clearly outlines three systematic biases in users predictions: a tendency
to underestimate the advantage gained by playing at home, a tendency to overestimate
the performance of the team one supports, and a tendency to under-react to the past
performance of the team one supports. While it is not in the interest of Superbru man-
agement to attempt to convince their users of these biases, or to correct for them, it is
not difficult to envisage the kinds of debiasing interventions that might lead to better
forecasts. Indeed the literature around debiasing (e.g. von Winterfeldt, 1999; Larrick,
2007; Montibeller and von Winterfeldt, 2015) suggests that a simple message informing
users about the established biases when they are asked to make a prediction, or the use
of counter-factual statements warning them against distorted predictions, might persuade
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at least some users to reconsider their intuitive judgments and in doing so might achieve
some reduction in the magnitude of the observed biases. Accordingly, while we have not
attempted debiasing procedures in this particular case, we hope that readers will see how
behavioural analysis might fruitfully be applied in an improving mode to further these
kinds of aims.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we suggested different modes that can support Behavioural Operational
Research (BOR) researchers and practitioners in using Behavioural Decision Research
(BDR) for exploring behavioural datasets. We identified six main streams of BDR (cog-
nitive biases, prospect theory, intertemporal choices, debiasing, heuristics and collective
judgments) and suggested how they can be used in three modes: describing behavioural
trends, exploiting behavioural findings, and improving user’s judgments and choices.
We illustrated the use of this taxonomy in three real-world studies, each one covering
a mode of exploration. These six BDR streams are not mutually exclusive, and BOR
researchers and practitioners may well explore more than one in a single study, for instance
by detecting a cognitive bias and then improving judgments with a suitable de-biasing tool,
as illustrated in Case III, or by drawing concepts from one stream (prospect theory) to
analyze a problem under another stream (heuristics), as done in Case II.
While the behavioural literature is already widely available to BOR researchers and
practitioners, our contribution is to summarize the large set of developments in BDR in a
coherent and hopefully useful way for BOR research and practice. Although behavioural
issues have been regularly analyzed in the past, particularly in marketing research, we hope
that our review and taxonomy provides a way of organizing general behavioural issues
in behavioural datasets, as well as helping to provide structuring tools to unstructured
behavioural databases.
We recognize that our classification of BDR streams and modes of practice, in common
with any taxonomy, simplifies a large body of literature and several types of application
areas. In addition we do not make any claim that the taxonomy, despite our best efforts,
is completely exhaustive. There are therefore several areas open to further research. From
a descriptive point of view, systematic surveys could investigate how practitioners are
using behavioural datasets in practice and if such deployment matches our taxonomy,
thus validating or refining/redesigning it. A research agenda with multiple-case studies, in
which the taxonomy is prescriptively employed to guide the choices of streams and modes,
also would be welcome and in line with calls for practitioners to develop Behavioural
OR case studies (Ormerod, 2017). From a conceptual point of view, research could be
conducted on further formalization of the modes of use we suggest and their links with
each stream. In addition other BDR streams might be incorporated into the taxonomy,
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given how large the field is and how fast it develops. Finally, our literature review showed
that the improving mode is currently underdeveloped; there is clearly much scope for
BOR practice to improve user’s judgment and decision making, particularly in public
decisions (Tsoukias et al., 2013), and to BOR researchers to assess the impact on users
and organizations when this mode is employed.
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